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Abstract: We will consider two models describing certain
market structures: (i) a domestic market in which a public
firm (whose objective is to maximize social welfare) com-
petes with two private firms (whose objective is to maximize
their own profits); and (ii) an international market in which
a domestic public firm competes with one domestic private
firm and one foreign private firm. In both situations, firms
decide simultaneously the price for their substitutable goods.
The main purpose of the paper is to present and to compare
the equilibrium outcomes of the two triopoly models.
keywords: Modeling, Optimization, Industrial Organiza-
tion, Game Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
There are several research works on mixed oligopolies, in
which public firms compete with private firms (see, for ex-
ample, Ferreira and Ferreira [1], Fjell and Pal [2], Matsumura
[3], Ogawa and Kato [4], Ohnishi [5] and White [6]). Public
firms maximize social welfare, whereas private firms maxi-
mize their own profits. We can find public firms competing
with private firms in many industries such as airlines, auto-
mobiles and banking. These mixed competitions can also
be found in international markets. Some literature examines
mixed models with quantity competition and some other ex-
amines price quantity. Some authors study mixed models
where the decisions are taken simultaneously and some oth-
ers consider mixed models with sequential decisions. Fur-
thermore, there are papers presenting models with homoge-
nous goods and papers presenting models with differentiated
goods.
In this paper, we start from Ohnishi [5], who examines do-
mestic (respectively, international) mixed competition with
a public firm competing on price with a domestic (respec-
tively, foreign) private dirm. We do a similar analysis in
a framework of a market with three firms. We consider a
mixed triopoly with one public firm F0 and two private firms
F1 and F2. In the international competition, the private firm
F2 is a foreign firm. Furthermore, and also in contrast with
Ohnishi [5], we assume that the home government imposes
a tariff on the imported good. We compute the equilibrium
outcomes of the domestic and international mixed competi-
tions and we also compare the results obtained in both mod-
els. In contrast with the results obtained by Ohnishi [5], in
our triopoly model, the domestic private firm’s profit in the
domestic competition is higher than the foreign private firm’s
profit in the international mixed competition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we present the domestic mixed triopoly model and
the corresponding equilibrium outcomes. In section 3, we
present the international mixed triopoly model and the its
equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 compares the rersults of
the two models. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. DOMESTIC MIXED TRIOPOLY
We consider a mixed triopoly with one public firm F0 and
two private firms F1 and F2. Assume that firms produce dif-
ferentiated goods and the market demand is given by
pi = α− qi − βQ−i,
where pi is the price of good i, qi is the output of good i, α is
a positive constant and β ∈ (0, 1) is a constant that captures
the extent of good differentiation, Q−i =
∑
j 6=i qj is the total
output of all firms other than Fi. Thus, we get
qi =
α(1− β)− (1 + β)pi + β(pj + pk)
1 + β − 2β2
,
with i, j, k = 0, 1, 2 and i 6= j 6= k. For simplicity, we
assume α = 1 and β = 0.5. The consumer surplus is, there-
fore, given by
CS =
3(p2
0
+ p2
1
+ p2
2
+ 1)
4
−
p0p1 + p0p2 + p1p2 + p0 + p1 + p2
2
.
Each firm’s profit function is defined by
pii = (pi − c)qi, i = 0, 1, 2,
where c > 0 is the unit production cost. We assume c < 1 to
assure that production outputs are positive. Social welfare is
defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus:
W = CS + pi0 + pi1 + pi2.
The decision variables of the firms are the prices for the
goods they produce, and they choose their values simultane-
ously.
The public firm F0 aims to maximize the social welfare
W , and the private firms F1 and F2 aim to maximize their
own profits pi1 and pi2, respectively.
In the domestic price-setting triopoly model presented
above, we get the following results 1.
Proposition 1. In the domestic price-setting triopoly, as de-
scribed above, the equilibria outcomes are given by
pD
0
=
11c+ 2
13
,
pD
1
= pD
2
=
10c+ 3
13
,
qD
0
=
1− c
2
,
qD
1
= qD
2
=
9(1− c)
26
,
piD
0
=
(1− c)2
13
,
piD
1
= piD
2
=
27(1− c)2
338
,
CSD =
323(1− c)2
676
,
WD =
483(1− c)2
676
.
1Throughout the paper, we use the notation superscript D to refer to the
domestic competition.
3. INTERNATIONAL MIXED TRIOPOLY
In this section, we consider an international mixed tri-
opoly with one public firm F0, one domestic private firm F1
and one foreign private firm F2. The utility, demand, and
profit functions are the same as those considered in the pre-
vious section. Domestic social welfare is now given by
W = CS + pi0 + pi1
=
3(1− p2
0
− p2
1
+ p2
2
)
4
+
p0p1 − p2 + 2c(p0 + p1 − p2 − 1)
2
.
We also assume that, in this international framework, the
home government imposes a tariff t on the imported goods.
Therefore, the profit function of the foreign firm is defined
by
pi2 = (p2 − c− t)q2.
The payoff function of the home government is defined by
U = W + tq2.
So, in this case, the game has two stages:
• In the first stage, the home government chooses the im-
ported tariff t;
• In the second stage, all firms choose, simultaneously,
the prices for their goods.
In the international price-setting triopoly model presented
above, we get the following results 2.
Proposition 2. In the domestic price-setting triopoly, as de-
scribed above, the equilibria outcomes are given by
t =
1295(1− c)
6683
,
pI
0
=
6166c+ 517
6683
,
pI
1
=
5132c+ 1551
6683
,
pI
2
=
4577c+ 2106
6683
,
qI
0
=
8789(1− c)
13366
,
qI
1
=
4653(1− c)
13366
,
qI
2
=
2433(1− c)
13366
,
piI
0
=
4543913(1− c)2
89324978
,
2Throughout the paper, we use the notation superscript I to refer to the
international competition.
piI
1
=
7216803(1− c)2
89324978
,
piI
2
=
1973163(1− c)2
89324978
,
CSI =
89208011(1− c)2
178649956
,
W I =
112729443(1− c)2
178649956
.
4. COMPARISONS
In this section, we compare the domestic and international
mixed triopoly equilibria. The results are stated in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium outcomes of the domestic
and international mixed triopoly models, we have that
piD
0
> piI
0
, piD
1
< piI
1
, piD
2
> piI
2
,
CSD < CSI , WD > W I .
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied domestic and international
mixed triopoly models with price-setting competition. We
have seen that the public firm’s profit and the social welfare
are higher in the domestic competition than in the interna-
tional competition. Furthermore, the domestic private firm’s
profit in the domestic competition is also higher than the for-
eign private firm’s profit in the international mixed compe-
tition. However, the domestic private firm’s profit and the
consumer surplus are lower in the domestic competition than
in the international competition.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank ESEIG and Polytechnic Institute of Porto for
their financial support.
References
[1] F.A. Ferreira, and F. Ferreira, “Privatization and gov-
ernment preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackel-
berg versus Cournot,” In Tenreiro Machado et al.
(Eds.) Discontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear
Physical Systems. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1-
24, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, pp.
421-430, 2014.
[2] K. Fjell, and D. Pal, “A mixed oligopoly in the pres-
ence of foreign private firms,” Canadian Journal Eco-
nomics, Vol. 29, pp. 737-743, 1996.
[3] T. Matsumura, “Stackelberg mixed duopoly witha a
foreign competitor,” Bulletin of Economic Research,
Vol. 55, pp. 275-287, 2003.
[4] A. Ogawa, and K. Kato, “Price competition in a mixed
duopoly,” Economics Letters, Vol. 12, pp. 4-15, 2006.
[5] K. Ohnishi, “Domestic and international mixed mod-
els with price competition,” International Review of
Economics , Vol. 57, pp. 1-7, 2010.
[6] M. White, “Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsi-
dization,” Economics Letters, Vol. 53, pp. 189-195,
1996.
